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 1
Introduction 
 
The term “new public management” has developed as “summary description of a way 
of reorganising public sector bodies to bring their management, reporting, and 
accounting approaches closer to (a particular perception of) business methods”.1 As 
a doctrine, the new public management refers to the failures and inadequacies of public 
sector performance over time, and locates the problem as lying in the nature and 
processes of public sector activity and public administration. Centralised bureaucracies, 
waste and inefficiency in resource use and inadequate mechanisms of accountability are 
all problems which the new public management sought to tackle. This paper outlines the 
shift from traditional public administration to new public management and considers the 
theoretical background, as well as the principal reform agenda under the new public 
management in the UK. Finally, the paper reflects on the UK experience and on the 
possible adaptation of the UK reforms on an international basis.  
 
 
 
1. From Traditional Public Administration to New Public 
Management 
 
The study of the public sector since the early 1980s has been concerned 
predominantly with the so-called “paradigm shift” from principles of public 
administration (Weberian model of public administration) to those of public 
management; that is, “the apparent move away from what is now seen as a 
traditional, progressive-era set of doctrines of good administration, emphasising 
orderly hierarchies, depoliticized bureaucracies, and the elimination of duplication or 
overlap, and toward what has...been described as the “new public management”2. 
 
In its application, the term ‘new public management’ has come to identify a series of 
methods and programmes aimed at reforming the organisation and processes of the 
public sector in order to make it more competitive and efficient in resource use and 
service delivery. In that sense, the new public management is concerned with the 
commercialisation, as far as is possible, of the state’s role in providing services to its 
citizens, and of the state’s relationship with its citizens. The central ‘doctrines’ of the 
new public management, together with brief statements of their meaning and 
argumentation, are set out in Table 1 below. 
 
 
DOCTRINE MEANING JUSTIFICATION 
Hands-on professional 
management. 
Visible managers at the top of the 
organisation, free to manage by 
use of discretionary power. 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility, 
not diffusion of power. 
Explicit standards and 
performance measures. 
Goals and defined targets which 
are specific, measurable, achievable, 
relevant and timed. 
Accountability means clearly 
stated aims; efficiency 
requires a ‘hard look’ at 
objectives. 
Emphasis on output 
controls. 
Resource allocation and rewards 
are linked to performance. 
Need to stress results rather 
than inputs and procedures. 
                                                          
1 Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, p. 9 
2 Hood, 1996, p. 268 
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Shift to disaggregation 
of units in the public 
sector. 
Disaggregate public sector into 
corporatised units of activity, 
organised by products, with 
devolved budgets. Units dealing 
at arm’s length with each other. 
Make units manageable; split 
provision and production, use 
contracts or franchises inside 
as well as outside the public 
sector. 
Shift to greater 
competition by the 
introduction of market 
disciplines in the public 
sector. 
Move to term contracts and 
public tendering procedures. 
Rivalry via competition as the 
key to lower costs, better 
standards and more 
innovation in product design. 
Stress on private-sector 
styles of management 
practice. 
Move away from traditional 
public service ethic to more 
flexible pay, hiring, rules, etc. 
Need to apply ’proven’ 
private sector management 
tools in the public sector. 
Stress on greater 
discipline and economy 
in resource use. 
Cutting direct costs, raising 
labour productivity, limiting 
compliance costs to business. 
Need to check resource 
demands of the public sector, 
and do “more with less”. 
 
Table 1: Doctrinal Components of the New Public Management 
Source: adapted from Hood, 1991, p.4f. 
 
Underlying this new public management is the central belief that public service 
provision is improved by the introduction of those changes listed in Table 1, which serve 
to transform both the organisational structure of public organisations and the processes 
by which public services are delivered. A summary of these central characteristics is 
provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
1.1 Hands-On Professional Management 
 
People involved with public service delivery should be proactive managers rather than 
reactive administrators. The modern public manager should have discretion in decision 
making within his or her area of responsibility. Unlike the traditional public 
administrator, who operated in accordance with established rules and regulations, and 
who implemented the policies of government with little or no discretion and with no 
direct responsibility, the public manager is a much more active individual, with decision-
making authority over, and responsibility for, the public service he or she delivers. Under 
the new public management, management lies at the core of public sector activity, and 
professional managers are viewed as the key to improved public sector performance. 
 
 
1.2 Explicit Standards of Performance 
 
New public management brings rigorous measures of performance to public sector 
organisations. This means that these organisations must pay closer attention to the aims 
and objectives they are following when delivering their services. Subjecting public 
managers to performance evaluation introduces disciplinary mechanisms which compel 
public sector bodies to focus on their specific responsibilities and carry out those tasks 
efficiently and effectively. As the public management school of thought argues, 
performance measurement also enables public sector bodies to be held directly to 
account for their activities (as will be discussed below). Under the regime of 
performance measurement, public sector organisations should be committed to an ethos 
of continuous improvement in levels and standards of service delivery. 
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1.3 Greater Emphasis on Output Controls 
 
Linked to performance measurement is the need for a focus on results rather than 
processes. In the past, public sector organisations often failed to concern themselves with 
their outputs. Rather, the focus was on inputs, given that political debates on public 
sector matters usually revolved around the question of resources. Under the new public 
management, the focus is shifted to results. The important question for the proactive 
public manager is what he or she actually achieves with the resources available. 
 
 
1.4 Disaggregation of Public Sector Units 
 
In order to facilitate much of the above, the new public management calls for 
disaggregation and decentralisation in public sector organisations. Given that public 
management embodies a strong criticism of the bureaucratic form of organisation, it is 
not surprising that it advocates a disaggregation of bureaucratic units in order to form a 
more efficient, accountable public service. Smaller units are more efficient because they 
are better able to establish objectives and work towards them more quickly and directly. 
They are more accountable, because the “faceless bureaucrat” is replaced with visible, 
responsible managers who are directly accountable to the public. 
 
 
1.5 Greater Competition in Public Service Provision 
 
Two central arguments within the public choice approach are that: 
 
• the market, not government, is the best allocator of resources; 
• individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. 
 
As such, market disciplines are introduced to the public sector, in the belief that the 
threat of competition and rivalry between providers fosters efficiency in service 
provision and choice for the customer. This has important implications for both public 
service providers and users. On the provider side, public service delivery agencies, 
through market mechanisms (e.g. competition with providers from the private sector), 
will supposedly be forced to improve the quality of service. On the customer side, the 
public is put into the role of consumers with rights in the newly evolving public sector 
marketplace. 
 
 
1.6 Private Sector Styles of Management 
 
An important theme within public management is that the public sector should seek to 
behave in a more business-like manner (i.e. more like the private sector). The idea 
behind is that the efficiency of public service provision is enhanced where a public sector 
agency conducts its affairs in accordance with business principles. Therefore, public 
service agencies should adopt reward structures for their employees, much like those in 
the private sector, encompassing such mechanisms as performance-related pay and more 
flexible working practices. 
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1.7 Greater Discipline and Economy in Resource Use 
 
Underpinning these different recommendations is the important requirement that public 
service agencies must pay much greater attention to the way in which they use the 
financial and human resources at their disposal. The emphasis in the new public 
management is very much on cutting the cost of public service provision, while, at the 
same time, increasing its quality (i.e. doing more with less). 
 
The fundamental nature of the shift from public administration to new public 
management is illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: From traditional public administration to New Public Management 
Source: P. Dunleavy and C.C. Hood, 1994, p.10. 
 
 
As Figure 1 indicates, the shift from public administration to new public management 
involves a move in the basic design co-ordinates of public sector organisation.3 On the 
one hand, the public sector becomes less distinctive from the private sector, while on 
the other, the degree of discretionary power (particularly over staff, contracts and 
money) of public managers is increased, as the procedural rules are relaxed. More 
specifically, this shift consists of: 
 
• Budgets being transparent in accounting terms, with costs attributed to 
outputs not inputs, and outputs being measured by performance indicators. 
 
                                                          
3 Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, p. 9 
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• Viewing organisations as a chain of low-trust principal/agent relationships 
and a network of contracts linking incentives to performance (rather than 
long term relational commitments or trustee-beneficiary ones). 
 
• Disaggregating separable functions into quasi-contractual or quasi-market 
forms, particularly by introducing purchaser/provider distinctions. 
 
• Opening up provider roles to competition between agencies or between 
public agencies, firms and not-for-profit bodies. 
 
• Deconcentrating provider roles to the minimum-feasible sized agency, 
allowing users more scope for “exit” from one provider to another, rather 
than relying on “voice” options to influence how public service provision 
affects them.4 
 
 
2. Theoretical Origins of the New Public Management 
 
New Public Management can be seen as a “marriage of two different streams of 
ideas”5. One part is the “new institutional economics”, which embraces public choice 
(institutions in the political/public sector) 6, transaction cost theory and principal-agent 
theory (institutions in the markets)7. Niskanen’s (1971) theory of bureaucracy is the 
most influential landmark in this development.8 The new institutional economics 
movement helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines built on ideas of 
contestability, user choice, transparency and close concentration on incentive 
structures. Such doctrines are very different from traditional ideas of administration 
with their emphasis on orderly hierarchies and elimination of duplication or overlap.9 
 
The other part is a set of successive waves of business-type “managerialism” in public 
sector, in the tradition of the international scientific management movement. This 
strand helped to generate a set of reform doctrines based on the ideas of “professional 
management” expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results (“free to 
manage”) and enforcing better organizational performance through the development 
of appropriate cultures and the active measurement of organizational outputs.  
 
These two different backgrounds also provoke two competing approaches to new 
public management: giving managers more flexibility, as the administrative system is 
seen as the obstacle for good management of the public sector (“letting the managers 
manage”, managerialism), while holding the bureaucrats accountable for results, as 
they are seen as utility maximizers who need incentives to do a proper job (“making 
the managers manage”, public choice).10 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, p. 9 
5 Hood, 1991, p. 5 
6 classification according to Erlei, Leschke and Sauerland, 1999, p. 44 
7 ibid 
8 Hood, 1991, p. 5 
9 ibid 
10 Kettl, 2000, p. 9, p. 31 
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2.1 Managerialism 
 
The managerialism in public management has been driven by the same forces 
experienced in private-sector management, namely a greater focus on economy and 
efficiency (in terms of the relationship between revenues and expenditure – doing 
more with less) on the one hand and an increased concern with the quality of products 
and services, on the other hand.11 Managerialism is therefore about the 
implementation of private-sector management practices into the public sector. 
 
The following characteristic components of managerialism can be identified:12 
 
• Budgeting and accounting: Output-driven accrual accounting systems provide 
the foundation for reforms in many countries. Accrual accounting has been an 
important tool in making government more transparent. Reforms have tried to 
force government officials to confront the full cost of their decisions as they 
make them, rather than to rely on short-term accounting devices to sift the 
costs of present decisions to future years. Managers’ flexibility in deciding 
how to meet the targets within broad resource allocations is being increased 
(e.g. through “portfolio budgeting” which lays down goals and targets but 
leaves the allocation of resources to meet the targets up to managers’ discrete 
decisions). 
 
• Customer service: Officials have implemented broad initiatives to improve the 
responsiveness of public programs to citizens’ needs. To improve the citizens’ 
trust and confidence in and support for government, officials have worked to 
make services friendly, convenient and seamless. Public services today should 
accommodate themselves to the citizens (e.g. office hours, schedules and in 
the way of doing business). Many governments have developed “one-stop 
shops”, interactive technology or case management strategies to make service 
delivery more seamless for citizens.  
 
• Performance management and output measurement: Reforms have linked the 
performance assessment process with the management of government’s goals 
and objectives. New Zealand’s agency-based contracts, which tie together the 
government’s goals, the agency’s budget and program outputs, are the 
prototype of reforms on this topic, but have been followed by the US and the 
UK with similar approaches. In some systems the assessment of performance 
has been extended to performance pay for managers and senior officials. 
 
• Information technology: In many ways technology is the ultimate boundary-
spanning technique, as it has the ability to traverse organisational boundaries 
and allows quick and easy connections between citizens and government, 
regardless of which agencies are in charge of providing which services. 
Information technology not only provides a boundary-spanning approach to 
public sector reform, it is indeed a change agent itself by its ability to bring 
about innovative ways of service delivery. On the other side, the spread of 
information technology raises questions about privacy issues as well (e.g. 
which information is being collected? Who will have access to the collected 
                                                          
11 Aucoin, 1995, p. 9 
12 Kettl, 2000, p. 14; pp. 36-47 
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information? How can the information be kept out of the hands of those who 
are not concerned with it?) 
 
• Privatisation and Contracting: Besides the ideological and economic 
arguments of bureaucracy theory of the superiority of the private sector, 
governments’ activities in the field of market mechanisms stem from a 
managerialist corner as well. Governments have privatised operations and 
service delivery to the private sector where possible and have developed new 
service delivery partnerships with private and non-profit organisations (e.g. 
public-private partnerships). These activities can be seen as a way to shrink the 
size of the state, get innovative private-sector approaches into the public 
domain and provide governments with more flexibility for tackling difficult 
management issues. To manage contracting arrangements effectively, 
governments must have the capacity to write and manage contracts, to specify 
what they want to buy, run fair and competitive markets and carefully asses 
the quality of what they buy. The need for effective contract management has 
led to the development of new management tools.  
 
 
2.2 Public Choice 
 
The theories stemming from the new institutional economics have sharp implications 
for the restructuring of the public sector.13 Much of the criticism about traditional 
public administration and many successive reforms to modernise the public sector 
derive from assumptions and arguments of Niskanen’s (1971) public choice theory. 
The theory assumes that bureaucrats are motivated primarily by self-interest. 
Moreover, this problem is exacerbated by the absence of appropriate organisational 
structures and processes in the public sector (i.e. absence of effective market forces). 
Three specific characteristics of public bureaucracies are believed to lead to a lack of 
efficiency and effectiveness: the monopolistic structure of public service markets, the 
absence of valid indicators of organizational performance, and the large size of many 
government agencies.14 
 
 
2.2.1 Public Service Monopolies 
 
Public choice arguments on the cost of monopoly draw directly on neo-classical 
economics. The theory suggests that if appropriate market structures are created in the 
public sector, then the behaviour of bureaucrats will be steered towards the general 
welfare of society rather than their own interests.  
 
Public choice theorists assume that public agencies have been unduly protected from 
the pressure of competition. Public agencies have traditionally had a large share of the 
national UK market in services such as health, education and the provision of rented 
housing. In addition, most of the public had no option but to use the services offered 
by monopolistic public suppliers. The small private sectors in health and education 
provided an “exit” option for dissatisfied wealthy customers. The bulk of the 
population, however, were forced to exercise “voice” if services were unsatisfactory. 
                                                          
13 Ferlie et al, 1996, p. 10 
14 Boyne, 1998, pp. 43f 
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Public monopoly is assumed to lead to poor performance because officials have little 
incentive to keep their costs down or to find innovative methods of service delivery. 
Whereas in the private sector the rewards of managers and the survival of firms are 
linked to profitability, such pressures are absent in the traditional public organization. 
Furthermore, financial resources are not provided by customers, but by a “political 
sponsor” who allocates funds to public agencies. Therefore, to the extent that 
bureaucrats are responsive to external pressures, they are more likely to pay attention 
to the desires of politicians than the needs of the public. However, according to public 
choice theory, politicians are also motivated by self-interest (votes, power) rather than 
public welfare. 
 
 
2.2.2 Information on Organizational Performance 
 
Even if public agencies are monopolists, bureaucratic behaviour doesn’t necessarily 
need to have negative consequences if it can be monitored and controlled. Close 
scrutiny and effective management could, in principle, lead to organizational activities 
that promote the public interest. The problem, according to public choice theory, is 
that there are no unambiguous indicators of performance in the public sector, so it is 
difficult to evaluate or influence the behaviour of agencies or individuals. Niskanen 
(1971) notes that bureaucrats and their political sponsors who allocate public funds 
are in a position of bilateral monopoly, which would appear to allocate equal power 
on each side. However, officials are more powerful than politicians because of the 
difficulty of measuring service outputs and costs. Niskanen (1971) argues that only 
the bureaucrats know the true cost of delivering the level of output desired by their 
political sponsor. It is, therefore, easy for officials to persuade politicians to allocate 
more money than is really required for service provision. By contrast, bureaucrats are 
able to make an accurate guess about the maximum funds that politicians are prepared 
to provide for a given level of service activities. 
 
Taken together, the selfishness and monopoly power of public officials result in a 
number of negative effects on the production of public services. Over time, the 
interests of the bureaucrats themselves become more and more important in justifying 
the organization. Although all organizations have inherent tendencies towards 
expansion, this phenomenon is especially pronounced in the public sector where the 
ability to obtain income in a market cannot serve as an objective guide to the 
desirability of extending, maintaining or contracting the level of expenditures it 
undertakes. The inability of bureaus to rely on markets as objective indicators of 
output value affects their operation. 
 
 
2.2.3 Organizational Size 
 
Pubic choice theories argue that the adverse effects of monopolistic market structures 
and intransparent standards of performance are reinforced by the large size of many 
public organizations. The problems of co-ordination and control grow 
disproportionately with organizational size, and the increase in scale eventually 
reduces performance, which is associated with declining “marginal efficiency”. This 
suggests that the attainment of organizational objectives is maximized at some point, 
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but then begins to decline. At the extreme, performance will fall to zero at very large 
scales of operation. Large public bureaucracies do not respond to new circumstances 
and are slow to deliver services. The speed and flexibility of its operation steadily 
diminish. 
 
Agencies that operate at a small scale are more likely to recognize new service needs 
and produce services quickly. Niskanen (1971) also argues that the greater the scale of 
operations, the greater the degree of monopoly power. He claims that big 
bureaucracies are especially able to extract revenue from their political sponsors, 
provide poor quality services at high cost, and evade attempts to monitor their 
performance. 
 
 
2.2.4 Public Choice Prescriptions 
 
Public choice remedies for the problem of bureaucracy follow directly from the 
diagnoses outlined above. First, the structure of public service markets should be 
more competitive. This implies rivalry between public organizations, and between 
public and private providers. The latter form of competition is advocated by Niskanen 
who argues that “the type of goods and services now provided by bureaus could be 
financed through government…but the provision of these services would be 
contracted to private, profit-seeking economic institutions. The bureaucracy, as such, 
would disappear, except for the review and contracting agencies”15. A second public 
choice prescription is to force public agencies to produce more information on their 
performance. This would shift the balance of power from bureaucrats to politicians, 
pressure groups and the public at large. However, there remains the threat that the 
creation of special monitoring agencies may generate a new bureaucracy and 
eventually become counter-productive. At the limit, the benefit of the additional 
performance measures may be less than the cost of generating the data. Nevertheless, 
the public choice view of the traditional public sector bureaucracy is that this point is 
far from being reached. The final reform which is recommended by public choice 
theorists is to break large agencies into smaller units. This implies separating multi-
function departments into single function organizations, so that performance becomes 
more visible; and disaggregating big bureaucracies into smaller, free standing “firms” 
which can then compete with each other for a share of the public sector market. 
 
 
3. UK Dimensions of the New Public Management 
 
In the UK, the new public management has found expression in the economic policies 
and related public sector reforms of Conservative governments since 1979. The new 
Labour Government has left the vast majority of Conservative reforms untouched. 
Indeed, since taking office in April 1997, the Labour Party has vigorously pursued 
policies which it had strongly opposed in the past. Essentially, the new public 
management has revolved around a central goal of making public sector organisations 
more economically efficient and more accountable for performance to the public they 
serve. A key to the achievement of this objective has been a major decentralisation 
exercise, through which large public bureaucracies have been disaggregated into 
                                                          
15 Niskanen, 1968, p. 305 
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smaller units of operation that are more visible and, thus, more accountable. Along 
with this decentralisation effort came the policy of ‘marketisation’. In this way, the 
public sector would operate in a competitive market environment in which members 
of the public could make demands of the public sector, holding public service 
providers accountable for performance in the same way as they do in the private 
sector. It is not possible, here, to provide a comprehensive review of the UK public 
management reform track. However, a short summary of the central reforms in Britain 
is given: 
 
• the “Next Steps” initiative and the establishment of executive agencies; 
• decentralisation; 
• the “new contractualism” in public administration; 
• accountability for performance; 
• the establishment of markets or quasi-markets 
• the separation of policy making from policy implementation; 
• the Citizen’s Charter initiative; 
• the Comprehensive Spending Review; 
• Best Value initiative in local government. 
 
 
3.1 The “Next Steps” Initiative and the Establishment of Executive Agencies 
 
One of the most important and earliest developments in public service reform in the 
UK has been the establishment of executive agencies, designed to carry out the 
service delivery activities of central government departments. Following its 1987 
general election victory, the Conservative Government published a report, Improving 
Management in Government: the Next Steps, which advocated far-reaching reforms in 
the organisation of the British civil service. Under these reforms, the civil service 
would be disaggregated into a series of single function agencies. These agencies (first 
referred to as Next Steps agencies, but now described as executive agencies) would be 
responsible to the respective ministries of government. Currently, there are over 100 
executive agencies, ranging from the very large Benefits Agency (around 66,000 
staff) to the Wilton Park Conference Centre (30 staff). Some two-thirds of the civil 
service are now employed in executive agencies. 
 
 
3.2 Decentralisation 
 
The principal rationale for the Next Steps programme was the then Government’s 
desire for decentralisation, a policy which has been at the heart of public management 
reform in the UK. During the 1980s and 1990 significant decentralisation has 
occurred throughout the British governmental system: 
 
• through a vigorous and wide-ranging programme of privatisation, under 
which the public industries and many public service organisations were 
removed from the public sector and subjected to the disciplines of the private 
market; 
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• through the increased use of the voluntary sector in the provision of public 
services (“mixed economy”), most notably in the area of social care and 
residential care of the elderly; 
• through a dramatic increase in the number of appointed bodies responsible 
for the delivery of important public services, such as higher and further 
education, and the management of hospitals; 
• through a devolution of responsibility within local government by way of the 
introduction of market disciplines in local service provision.  
 
 
3.3 The “Contract State” 
 
As an important element in the desire of the Thatcher Government in the early 1980s to 
reduce the level of public expenditure, the decision was taken to encourage public sector 
bodies to open many of their services to competitive tendering.16 This was the advent of 
“contractualism” in the public sector, which has taken the form of “market testing” in 
central government and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in local 
government. Under market testing and CCT, private companies can compete with 
public agencies for the contract to deliver public services. There can be either 
contracting-out (where the service contract is won by a private company), or 
contracting-in (where the contact is won by the public agency’s own direct service 
organisation). As an essential precondition for the establishment of market 
relationships in the public sector, a separation between the role of deciding what to 
provide and the role of actually providing it was instituted. This purchaser-provider 
distinction has promoted a movement toward contracts as the basis for public service 
delivery. Through contracts, public sector managers or local authorities act as agents for 
the client, namely the public.  
 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
The scope of CCT in local government was significantly enhanced through the Local 
Government Act of 1992. Under the terms of this legislation, the Audit Commission was 
empowered to publish performance indicators for local authorities and to monitor 
performance in regard to these indicators. As such, local authorities were required for the 
first time to publish information on their performance. This requirement was specified by 
the Audit Commission in December 1992 as part of its role under the Act and as part of 
the Citizen's Charter initiative.17 In local government, the introduction of compulsory 
competition had a number of important implications for service provision. First, 
competition provided an impetus for service review, in the sense that local authorities 
were now more concerned with monitoring the management of services. Second, 
competition facilitated an improvement in the level of knowledge within local authorities 
of the cost of service provision18. Third, local authorities now have clearer statements of 
performance targets to be achieved. These targets serve as a justification and a rationale 
for action within local authorities19. Finally, the introduction of competition highlights 
the issue of accountability, both to elected members and the public. The increasing shift 
to contractualism sharpens the process of accountability. The basis of the relationship 
                                                          
16 Moreover, the introduction of contracts in public service delivery was consistent with a second objective of the 
Conservative Government, namely to separate the process of service provision from politics; Walsh, 1995, p. 
112 
17 Audit Commission, 1994 
18 Lawton and Rose, 1991, pp. 145-6; Walsh and Davis, 1993, p. 165 
19 Walsh and Davis, 1993, p. 165 
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between the two sets of actors, which is the public sector body putting the contract out to 
tender, on the one hand, and the contractor who physically provides the service, on the 
other hand, is the contract. The public sector agency which draws up the contract 
specifies the standard of performance required in service delivery and thus becomes 
aware of the true cost of service provision. The increased concern with performance 
standards embodied within contracts makes public sector agencies and local authorities 
more concerned with efficiency in resource use and quality of service. Moreover, the 
contractor is responsible for delivering the service as specified in the contract and will be 
judged on that basis by the client (i.e. the public sector organization). 
 
 
3.4 Accountability for Performance 
 
Underlying the public sector reforms in the UK has been an attempt to enhance the 
accountability of public sector institutions to the people they serve through a greater 
concern with performance measurement. Through the shift towards contractualism, 
public service providers are forced to engage directly with the question of standards and 
quality in service provision. This links directly to a central issue which lies at the heart of 
the consumerist ethos and the Citizen's Charter, namely the establishment of 
performance indicators and performance targets in the public sector. 
 
Since the early 1980s concern with the improvement of public services has focused on 
the pursuit of greater efficiency and effectiveness. However, while it is not so 
problematic to subject private sector enterprises to performance measurement, a similar 
exercise in the public sector is more difficult. There are a number of reasons for this 
difficulty. First, many public sector organisations are monopoly suppliers of services 
(e.g. there is only one Department of Social Security). Consequently, a member of the 
public being dissatisfied with the quality of service received at his or her local benefits 
office cannot go elsewhere. In a competitive environment, the producer has a clear 
incentive to maintain a high level of performance in relation to the service provided to 
the customer. Monopolists lack that incentive. In order to counter this situation, as will 
be discussed, the Citizen’s Charter embodies strong complaints mechanisms whereby the 
public sector consumer can claim redress should he or she be unhappy with the standard 
of service provided. Second, the public sector does not always provide a clearly 
identifiable product. What, for example, does a university produce? What is the 'product' 
rendered by the prison service? Such ambiguities make performance measurement more 
difficult in the public sector. Third, the public sector often lacks a clearly identifiable 
customer. In the private sector, the customer is the individual to whom the provider 
wishes to sell his or her goods. In the public sector, however, the situation is not so 
straightforward. For example, a civil servant working in an executive agency established 
under the Next Steps programme could view several people as customers: the member of 
the public with whom he or she is dealing; the minister with responsibility for the 
service; Parliament which is elected by, and accountable to, the electorate and which 
approves the level of funding for agencies; or the taxpayer who might not use the service 
in question but who contributes through taxation. 
 
Due to these problems the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector is 
more difficult. Nevertheless, a great deal of effort has gone into subjecting the public 
sector to strict performance measurement. Indeed, this lies at the core of the Citizen’s 
Charter and the Best Value Initiative which have enshrined within their pages a clear 
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commitment to service quality on the part of the public sector; clear and agreed criteria 
of assessment for public service providers; increased visibility of people working in the 
public sector to provide a more tangible and accountable posture for the customers; a 
strong commitment to the public sector and to continued improvement in service 
provision; and a requirement that those delivering services be directly answerable to the 
public. Indeed, through the establishment of performance targets within the Citizen's 
Charter and with Best Value, public sector managers are supposed to be responsible for, 
and accountable to, the public for their organisation’s use of resources. 
 
 
3.5 Markets or Quasi-Markets in the Public Sector 
 
“Traditionally, the public services have been monolithic organisations with overall 
management, finance control and budgetary control all held in the centre”.20 A key 
element of reform has been the replacement of this centralist organisational structure 
with smaller, decentralised, market-oriented organisations which are subjected to 
competitive forces. In this way, attempts were made to create multiple service providers 
in as many individual public services as possible, for example, through CCT. 
Furthermore, as Stewart and Walsh assert, “in the government’s proposals on 
community care, local authorities are to be encouraged to use many alternative sources 
of provision. In health and education, the emphasis is placed on the independence of the 
separate institutions through opting out, or on greater control over their own 
management by the institutions through devolved control. The “monolithic” institution 
of the health service and of the education service is being broken down into its 
component parts”.21 
 
As such, the possibility for competition between alternative providers in the different 
sectors of public service arises. Of course, not all these markets which have been 
established are consumer-led. For example, in the National Health Service, markets are 
still largely dominated by health care providers, with health authorities, clinicians or 
general practitioners making choices on behalf of their patients. Even where the 
consumer does have a degree of choice, as in education where parents have some 
discretion over the choice of school for their children, a fully market-oriented 
environment hasn’t developed yet. As Stewart and Walsh state, “because there is no 
question of direct payment and because of the limitation on the number of places 
available, what are being created are quasi-markets rather than markets. There is 
limited freedom on the demand side, with very little change as yet on the supply side”.22 
 
A further element in the effort to subject the public sector to market forces has been the 
increased use of fees and charges for public services.23 Across a wide range of public 
services, including health care, education and a wide range of local authority services, 
charges are used in different ways.24 All these charges serve the purpose of signalling to 
service providers how much consumers are willing to pay for a service. Charging is thus 
deemed to be fair in the sense that an individual who makes use of a particular service is 
                                                          
20 Major, 1989, p. 4 
21 Stewart and Walsh, 1992, p. 506 
22 Stewart and Walsh, 1992, p. 507 
23 Bailey, Falconer and McChlery, 1993; Walsh, 1995, pp. 83-109 
24 e.g. Charges for prescriptions, dental and ophthalmic treatment in health care, for school meals, school trips and 
music lessons in schools, and for admittance to museums, recreational facilities and care for the elderly in local 
authorities; 
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paying directly for the benefit he or she receives.25 As such, charges serve not only as a 
way of introducing market mechanisms into the delivery of public services, but also as a 
means of reducing public expenditure since people are paying for a service which 
otherwise would require public funding.26 
 
 
3.6 Separation of Policy Making and Policy Implementation 
 
Traditionally, public service delivery was subject to political control exercised through 
departments of state, their ministers and thereby the government of the day and the 
elected legislature (The House of Commons). An important element of reform has been 
the attempt to separate the process of policy making from the operational management of 
the public services. For example, in the National Health Service, responsibility at the 
national level is exercised through both a Policy Board and a Management Executive. 
Basically, the role of government lies in setting the broad policy goals for the service, 
funding the service, and being accountable to Parliament for these policy decisions. 
Operationally, however, government has removed itself from the day-to-day 
management of the service, responsibility for which lies with the Management 
Executive. 
 
This change has clear implications for the nature of accountability in the public sector, as 
the traditional forms of political accountability are being replaced with a more direct 
form of managerial accountability which seems to build up a linear relationship between 
public service providers and the “consumers” of these services. However, this attempted 
shift from political to managerial accountability has not been accompanied by an 
appropriate alteration in the constitutional convention governing the relationship 
between elected politicians and the citizenry.27 Consequently, while government 
ministers might wish to “transfer responsibility” to public sector managers for the 
delivery and quality of public services, these same ministers cannot escape the fact that 
they are still constitutionally accountable for public services as elected representatives of 
the people. Public service deliverers may indeed be directly responsible in managerial 
terms to the public as consumers, but ministers remain equally accountable politically for 
that service to the public.  
 
 
3.7 The Citizen’s Charter 
 
The Citizen’s Charter emerged in 1991 as the centrepiece of John Major’s “commitment 
to quality” public sector reform agenda. In its application, the Citizen’s Charter initiative 
represents “a systematic attempt to focus on four main themes across the public services: 
quality, choice, standards and value”.28 According to the original Charter document29, 
these would be pursued through a range of reforms by which the public sector would 
operate more in line with its private sector counterpart: privatisation, competition and 
                                                          
25  On the other hand, charges for regulation services are perhaps the most hurting ones, as they are an 
additional imposition on those who have to pay to be registered or inspected. Byrne, 2000, p. 341; 
Therefore it is crucial to note that fees and charges are only signals for the willingness to pay for those 
services which in principle are marketable. 
26 Bailey, Falconer and McChlery, 1993, p. 29 
27 See Pyper, 1996 
28 Wilson, 1995, p. 94 
29 Major, 1991, pp. 4-5 
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contracting-out, performance measurement, clear complaints procedures and better 
forms of redress for citizens.  
 
Overall, the principal focus of the Citizen’s Charter is on improved public service for the 
individual citizen. However, while appealing to the interests and values of the “citizen”, 
it is the consumer whose interests and values the Charter addresses. The nature of the 
relationship between the government and its citizens was to be determined by way of 
changes in the management of service delivery, with the emphasis placed firmly on the 
concept of customer satisfaction. The Citizen’s Charter was characterised by an 
optimistic view of the role of the public sector and a predominant concern with “raising 
the standard” of service delivery across the range of public sector activities.30 This 
improvement in the standard of public service provision was viewed as deriving 
primarily from the development of a direct relationship between the service provider and 
the customer. In 1998, there were already around 200 national Charters31 and more than 
100,000 local charters in operation across the UK, each of which set out minimum 
service standards for public service provision. 
 
Under these Charters, as Wilson states32, “the citizen is now recognised as a consumer 
entitled to a given standard and variety of service. The traditional model for public 
service delivery, whereby bureaucrats sought to ensure equitable treatment for 
taxpayers through the provision of uniform services, has been jettisoned. Competition, 
responsiveness and choice prevent the standardisation of services in the private sector 
and should do so in the public sector”. 
 
As such, Charterism, the establishment of various Charter documents, has been aimed at 
enshrining the principle of consumer sovereignty in public service provision. Indeed, 
underlying all the various charters is a rigorous complaints procedure which provides the 
dissatisfied customer with direct avenues of redress. After all, for a consumerist ethos in 
the public sector, it is essential that the service user is able to register his or her 
displeasure if that service fails to meet expectations. As stated in the original Citizen’s 
Charter, “it is fundamental that all public services, including local authorities, should 
have clear and well-publicised complaints procedures”.33 These mechanisms, according 
to the Charter, should: 
 
• be open and accessible, and supported by clearly displayed standards at the 
point of service; 
• provide readily available information about how to complain, and a clearly 
identified point of contact for doing so; 
• provide a code of practice for the handling of complaints. This should include 
specific targets for dealing with complaints and clear information as to what 
the customer can do if he or she is dissatisfied with the response of a public 
sector agency to a complaint. 
 
Within the National Health Service, for example, every hospital and other unit engaged 
in the provision of health care must publicise the name, address and telephone number of 
a senior official responsible for dealing with patient complaints. This officer is required 
                                                          
30 Prior, 1995 
31 Promberger/Niederkofler/Bernhart, 2001, p. 54 
32 Wilson, 1995, p. 94 
33 Major, 1991, p. 42 
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to fully investigate the complaint and report the findings of the inquiry to the 
complainant. In cases where complainants are still not satisfied, they may refer the 
matter to the Health Service Commissioner (Ombudsman), who is empowered to 
investigate all complaints of a non-clinical nature and reports directly to Parliament. 
In placing the responsibility for service delivery squarely in the hands of public sector 
managers, the Citizen’s Charter is crucial to the new public management in the UK, with 
its continuing attempt to establish direct relationships between the providers of public 
services and their customers. Though not stated explicitly, the Charter initiative is aimed 
at reinforcing existing mechanisms of accountability through the development of 
managerial accountability which makes the providers of public services directly 
accountable to their customers through the mechanisms of quality assurance and redress 
enshrined within the Charters. Charters brought public statements of what standards of 
service the public had a right to expect. For example, before the publication of the 
Passenger’s Charter, British Rail (now privatised) did not make public its punctuality 
and reliability targets. The very fact that it is now taken for granted that there should be 
published targets is perhaps an indication that the Charter concept is beginning to take 
hold within the public sector.  
 
 
3.8 The Comprehensive Spending Review 
 
The Comprehensive Spending Review34, announced in June 1997, has taken a look at 
how the money in the public sector is spent to ensure that departments meet the 
Government’s priorities. It sets out a rigorous fiscal framework and firm overall 
spending limits for the following three years. Departmental Ministers have undertaken 
thirty reviews of their Department’s objectives, policies and spending plans to 
determine how best their programmes can contribute to the achievements of the 
Government’s objectives, including in particular its aims of enhancing opportunity 
and fairness, promoting employment and investment for sustained economic growth 
and increasing efficiency. Six of the reviews, including those on the criminal justice 
system and young children, have been carried out on a cross-departmental basis to 
ensure that policies and services are designed to meet the full range of public concerns 
in an integrated and co-ordinated way.35 The firm three year plans will enable 
departments to plan ahead and to provide a more stable foundation for managing 
public services. Departments will be able to reinvest the savings they made as 
spending can be moved to later years. Separate capital and current budgets will ensure 
that essential capital investment is not squeezed out by short-term pressures. It will 
also pave the way for the introduction of resource accounting and budgeting (RAB), 
which will improve the planning and controlling of spending and increase the 
incentives to manage assets effectively. 
 
As part of the CSR, there will be new innovations to improve service delivery and 
efficiency including: 
 
•  the review of the functions carried out by departments, agencies and non-
departmental public bodies on a five yearly cycle to establish whether the 
government needs to continue to perform them. Competition and 
                                                          
34 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4011/csr-sum.htm 
35 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4011/401102.htm 
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outsourcing will be used where the private or voluntary sector can carry out 
a function. 
•  measures to enable different parts of government to work better together, 
including cross-departmental budgets; 
•  an Invest to Save budget to encourage different parts of the public sector to 
work together to improve service delivery as dividing up responsibility for 
overlapping policy areas between several departments can make government 
intervention less effective; and 
•  more external inspections of public services (including a new Housing 
Inspectorate set up under Best Value.) 
 
Pubic Service Agreements 
The public service agreements36 between each department and the Treasury include 
the departmental objectives, which were defined during the Comprehensive Spending 
Review and measurable efficiency and effectiveness targets. Progress will be 
monitored by a continuous process of scrutiny and audit overseen by a Cabinet 
Committee. Challenging targets have been set for key public services, for example:37 
 
•  The NHS: a target of value for money improvements of some 3 per cent per 
year; 
•  Personal Social Services: efficiency targets of 2 – 3 per cent per year will be 
set over the next three years, supported by new performance measures and 
benchmarking between authorities; 
•  Police: an efficiency target of 2 per cent per year and annual efficiency plans 
introduced for the first time. 
 
Elements of Public Service Agreements include:38 
 
•  An introduction, setting out the minister(s) accountable for delivering the 
commitments, together with the coverage of the PSA, as some cover other 
departments and agencies for which the relevant secretary of state is 
accountable; 
•  The aims and objectives of the department or cross-cutting area (e.g. 
Department for Education and Employment – aim: “To give everyone the 
chance, through education, training and work, to release their full potential, 
and thus build an inclusive and fair society and a competitive economy.”39); 
•  The resources which have been allocated to it in the CSR; 
•  Key performance targets for the delivery of its services, together with, in 
some cases, a list of key policy initiatives to be delivered (e.g.: the number 
of pupils aged 5, 6 or 7 in infant classes of over 30 to fall from 477.000 to 
zero by September 2001 at the latest; an increase in the proportion of those 
aged 11 meeting the standard of literacy for that age from 63% to 80% by 
2002;40); 
•  A statement about how the department will increase the productivity of its 
operations. 
                                                          
36 http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4181.htm 
37 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4011/401105.htm 
38 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4181/psa-02.htm 
39 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4181/psa-03.htm 
40 http:// www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4181/psa-03.htm 
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3.9 The Best Value Initiative 
 
The Best Value regime emphasises continuous improvement, the analysis of 
performance and “management by fact” for local authorities. Best Value charges local 
authorities to make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way they 
exercise their functions, having regards to a combination of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Authorities have to ensure that their performance becomes consistent 
with the performance of the top 25% of all authorities at the time targets are set, and 
with an overall objective of 2% p.a. efficiency improvement.41 
 
These continuous improvement outcomes are to be achieved through prescribed intra-
organizational processes. A programme of Best Value reviews covering all local 
authority functions has to be undertaken over a five-year period. These reviews 
require the purpose of services to be challenged and the most effective means of 
delivering them to be identified. The Best Value review also has to take into account 
consultation with local taxpayers, service users and a wide range of other actors. 
Comparisons between providers have to be undertaken, and then competitiveness of 
the service tested. The Best Value review therefore aims to set in place a programme 
of continuous improvement, seeking to achieve ongoing incremental innovations in 
the delivery of public services. The outcome of the review is an action plan that sets 
targets to improved performance. Targets and methods for improvement are to be 
published in the performance plan, along with past performance and comparison with 
other providers. These intra-organizational processes are set within a corporate 
strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Best Value Processes 
Source: Boyne et al., 2002, p. 12 
 
 
Performance measurement under Best Value 
Since 1992, all local authorities have been required by statute to collect and publish a 
set of performance indicators specified annually by the Audit Commission, which is 
an independent body responsible for ensuring that public money is used economically, 
                                                          
41 Boyne et al., 2002, p. 11 
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efficiently and effectively.42 Under the BV legislation, these indicators are partly 
superseded by a new set of Performance Indicators specified by central government. 
Some of these are carried forward from the original Audit Commission’s set. The Best 
Value Performance Indicators now comprise 18 “corporate health” indicators and 104 
“service delivery indicators”. When authorities publish data against these performance 
indicators, local people will be able to compare the performance of their authority 
with other authorities and to see how their own authority’s performance is improving 
over time. The purpose of the corporate health BVPIs is to provide an overview of 
how well the authority is performing overall. The indicators cover:43 
 
•  Planning and measuring performance (in relation to sustainability and racial 
equality). 
• Customers and the community (for example percentage of complaints 
satisfied with the handling of complaints; electoral turnout). 
• Management of resources (for example proportion of council tax collected). 
• Staff development (for example proportion of working days lost to sickness 
absence). 
• Partnership working, as indicated by the percentage of partnerships 
following good practice guidelines. 
 
The “service delivery” BVPIs are divided into five “dimensions” of performance:44 
 
•  Strategic objectives: why the service exists and what it seeks to achieve. 
•  Cost-efficiency: the resources committed to a service, the efficiency with 
which they are turned into outputs. 
•  Service delivery outcomes: how well the service is being operated in order to 
achieve the strategic objectives. 
•  Quality: these indicators will explicitly reflect users’ experience of services. 
•  Fair access: ease and equality of access to services. 
 
External auditors assess whether local performance plans conform with statutory 
guidance. Auditors are required to submit a report on the performance plan to the 
authority, the Audit Commission, and, if the plan does not meet the statutory 
requirements, the Secretary of State. If there are found severe failures of process, a 
recommendation may be given that a special Best Value inspection of the whole 
authority or a particular service be carried out.  
 
 
4. The New Public Management: Reflecting on the UK Experience 
 
For our purposes, reflecting on the experience of the new public management is a 
practical exercise. It is concerned with making policy prescriptions which can be 
implemented with a fair expectation of success. In the words of Richard Rose, 
“Lessons [...] are tools for action. Politicians know what they would like to achieve, 
but the existence of a political majority for a goal is no assurance that politicians will 
                                                          
42 Boyne, 2000, p. 7 
43 Boyne, 2000, p.8 
44 ibid 
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know how to design a program that achieves this goal. Borrowing a program that is 
effective elsewhere is no guarantee of success”.45 
 
It is essential, when considering whether to follow policy approaches used elsewhere, 
to understand under what circumstances and to what extent these approaches will 
work effectively here. Alain Enthoven, writing about health policy in 1990, could 
easily have been referring to the new public management when he stated that “the 
really interesting questions are how to identify and design politically feasible 
incremental changes in each country that have a reasonably good chance of making 
things better. Each country can get useful ideas from others about how to do this”.46 
 
Given the international nature of the new public management, it is unavoidable that 
policymakers in one country will seek to follow reform programmes that appear to be 
successful elsewhere. In this respect, the UK might well be viewed as a laboratory for 
the new public management experiment, as might the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and other countries that have followed the path of public management 
reform. However, an important point is that any attempt to adapt programmes from 
others must take full account of the historical, cultural, social, economic and political 
environment pertaining to both the country seeking new ideas and the countries whose 
experience is being examined. For example, in the Central European nations, there has 
been a significant shift toward privatisation, something that has also taken place to a 
significant degree in the UK. However, there are dangers in making comparisons as 
the UK experience is not easily transferable. The privatisation programme pursued in 
Britain since 1979 was geared toward reducing public expenditure and increasing 
economic efficiency through the expansion of market forces in a mixed economy. In 
Central Europe, privatisation has been aimed at moving countries away from socialist 
systems of government with large involvement in national industries toward the 
development of new market-based structures and arrangements. As such, there are 
limits in the comparability of the British track of privatisation with central European 
countries. With this caveat in mind, what implications can be drawn from the UK 
experience? 
 
There is little doubt that the new public management has made significant inroads in 
the UK, giving rise to wide-ranging reforms of the public sector’s organisation and 
procedures. The disaggregation of the civil service into smaller executive agencies, 
for example, marks a major transformation in the structure of the British 
governmental system. Yet, the policies implemented by successive British 
governments to reform the nature of public service provision have not been without 
weaknesses. When we seek to evaluate the three main planks of public sector reform 
in the UK - decentralisation, enhanced accountability and the ‘marketisation’ of 
public service delivery - we find that their implementation has been problematic. 
 
Centralised Decentralisation 
First, a clear picture that emerges from the UK experience is that there is a distinction 
between decentralising units of operation and decentralising authority. The 
disaggregated public sector in Britain still operates ‘within a field or arena in which 
the hand of central government remains strong. “[...] (O)ne of the paradoxes of 
                                                          
45 Rose, 1993,  ix;  
46 Enthoven, 1990, p 58 
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contemporary management is that it both liberates and enslaves”47. In the National 
Health Service, for example, the National Health Service and Community Care Act of 
1990 promoted the development of self-managed units in the health service. As a 
consequence, hospitals established themselves as autonomous, self-managing trusts. 
However, in terms of authority, what this meant was that hospitals were now no 
longer under the auspices of local government. Rather, they were ultimately 
answerable to the Department of Health (i.e. central government). In a similar way, 
schools were encouraged to take responsibility for the administration of their own 
budgets under the 1988 Education Act (and by doing so ruling out the responsibilities 
and controls of the Local Education Authorities). Those schools which chose to opt 
out of local authority control now also found themselves ultimately responsible to 
central government. Operational managers might have discretionary authority over the 
use of resources, but central government retains control over the allocation of 
resources and the setting of performance standards. As Hoggett states, “operational 
decentralisation has proceeded against the background of governmental 
centralisation and has, if anything, served to reinforce centralisation processes”.48 
 
Consumers being citizens 
Second, on the question of accountability, citizens have not been empowered through 
public management reform. Public sector organisations and local authorities are now 
subjected to performance standards and are required to meet ever-increasing 
performance targets. However, these standards and targets are set by service 
providers. Members of the public have little, if any, influence over the standards of 
service provision. The Citizen’s Charter, by which the users of public services were 
supposed to be empowered, has failed to provide meaningful consumer powers to 
citizens.49 Indeed, contrary to the principle of consumer sovereignty, there is managerial 
dominance in relation to service quality in the public sector. In their relationship with 
public service providers, service users have weak powers of voice, and little, if any, 
power of exit from the ‘public sector marketplace’. As Hunt states, empowerment 
requires a transfer of power. Public service users can only be empowered when “the 
government or an agency acting on its behalf, chooses to relinquish some of its powers; 
to adjust, as it were, the power relationship between government and the governed. The 
problem with the Citizen’s Charter is that it implies both that the government is in some 
way divorced from the delivery of services and therefore not responsible for them and 
also that the power of the citizen in relation to these services can be increased without 
this affecting the existing powers of the government. However, ultimate responsibility for 
the delivery of public services does lie with government (central or local) and changes 
that ignore this are likely to achieve very little. The Charter thus runs the risk of being a 
limited exercise which possibly affects the rights of individual citizens at the margin but 
makes no real difference to the way in which services are delivered or received”.50 
 
A further criticism levelled at Charterism is that the concept of ‘citizen’ is given 
insufficient attention. Indeed, we can gather no general notion of the citizen from any of 
the charters currently in force. There are various references to users, customers or 
consumers, jobseekers, patients, passengers and parents. However, these are not citizens. 
The role of consumer entails a particular position within a network of market 
                                                          
47 Hoggett, 1996, p. 18 
48 Hoggett, 1996, p. 19 
49 Promberger/Niederkofler/Bernhart, 2001, pp. 72f 
50 Hunt, 1996, p. 59 
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relationships. To be a citizen is to be a member of a political community. This embraces 
a wider role, comprising a range of political relationships which link the individual with 
government and the state. Elcock expresses the concern that the Citizen’s Charter is 
concerned with enhancing “the protective rights, privileges and immunities accorded to 
customers’, and not with strengthening ‘the essentially participative role of the citizen in 
influencing the policies and management of the public services they pay for and use”.51 
For Elcock, “the implications of doing the latter are much more fundamental for the 
management of public services than are those of the former. However, they are not 
addressed in the Citizen’s Charter”.52  
 
Markets without choice 
Third, on the matter of ‘marketisation’, the simple point is that, with the absence of 
any meaningful opportunity to exercise choice in relation to public services, the 
proper operation of a market in public service delivery is seriously undermined. 
Across the range of public services, citizens are denied any real access to alternative 
modes of provision. As such, the powers of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ which inform the 
provider-customer relationship in private enterprise are largely absent in the public 
sector. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, the fact remains that the new public 
management has had a profound impact on the British public sector. The introduction 
of management principles and disciplines across the public sector has facilitated a 
radical transformation in the way in which the public domain is administered. Indeed, 
in the UK, the notion of public and private sectors as distinct and separate domains 
has been largely negated, with public organisations operating increasingly in a 
business-like manner, and with public and private enterprises working increasingly in 
partnership in the delivery of public services. With the new Labour Government in 
office, the central tenets of the new public management remain firmly established in 
the UK. 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Elcock, 1996, p. 37 
52 ibid 
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